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resumo Ainda que Rawls se refira poucas vezes a A. Smith, as idéias e argumentos de A
riqueza das nações são centrais para a sua teoria da justiça. Este artigo pretende mostrar
que sem as idéias que Smith propõe em A riqueza das nações, Rawls não teria sido capaz
de escrever A teoria da justiça As idéias de A riqueza das nações fornecem a Rawls a
questão central da teoria da justiça. Elas também fornecem o componente chave da sua
resposta a esta questão, sem o qual a resposta de Rawls teria sido sensivelmente diferente.
As contribuições de Smith para o conjunto das idéias que instigam Rawls a formular a sua
teoria da justiça são tão importantes quanto as contribuições de Kant e são mais impor-
tantes do que as contribuições de qualquer outro pensador além de Kant (talvez com a
exceção de Sidgwick). 
palavras-chave J. Rawls; A. Smith; teoria da justiça
It is well-known that John Rawls’s political philosophy owes a heavy
debt to the writings of the eighteenth-century German philosopher
Immanuel Kant. In the Preface to the original edition of A Theory of
Justice, Rawls describes his own theory, which he called “justice as fair-
ness,” as “highly Kantian in nature” (RAWLS, 1971, p. viii).The index to
the book shows more than twenty separate references to Kant – a
number that is equaled only by the number of references to Henry
Sidgwick – as well as more than twelve references to Rawls’s “Kantian
interpretation of justice as fairness” (this is the heading under which
these references are listed in Rawls’s index). Rawls published two papers
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about his theory of justice with titles that included Kant’s name, includ-
ing the important set of three lectures he offered at Columbia Univer-
sity in New York under the collective title “Kantian Constructivism in
Moral Theory.”
In contrast, A Theory of Justice contains only seven references to Adam
Smith, just three of which occur in the main text (the other four are
contained in footnotes) and four of which are to Smith’s first major
work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In spite of the shortage in Rawls’s
work of references to Smith’s later and even more famous book, the ideas
and arguments of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations are central to Rawls’s theory of justice. In fact without the ideas
Smith proposed in The Wealth of Nations, Rawls would not have been able
to write A Theory of Justice. Smith’s ideas in The Wealth of Nations supply
Rawls with the central question he attempts to answer in his theory of
justice.They also supply him with a key component of his answer to that
question, a component without which Rawls’s answer to the question
would have looked sharply different. Smith’s contributions to the set of
ideas on which Rawls drew to formulate his theory of justice are as
important to that theory as Kant’s contributions and are more important
to Rawls’s theory than the contributions of any thinker other than Kant
(with the possible exception of Sidgwick).
I
Let us first make a note of some of the most important ideas Rawls
borrowed from Kant’s moral theory. Kant’s theory was in large part a
critical response to the utilitarian tradition in moral and political philos-
ophy. Like the utilitarians, Kant wholeheartedly endorsed the idea that all
human beings are equal in worth – that, as John Stuart Mill said, every-
body should count for one and nobody for more than one. However,
Kant emphatically rejected the utilitarian assumption that the promotion
of human enjoyment or happiness can ever serve as a foundation for
sound ideas about justice. For Kant, the essential truth about human
beings - the truth that is relevant to considerations of justice - is that they
are free, rational, and responsible agents. The early utilitarians did not
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deny that human beings are (at least potentially) free and rational crea-
tures. However, these attributes did not constitute the basis of their ideas
about justice. For Kant, in contrast, the postulate that human beings are
(potentially) free, rational, and responsible is the foundation of all sound
ideas about justice and about morality as a whole.
An example Kant offers in his well-known essay on “Theory and
Practice” (KANT, 1991, pp. 70-71) is emblematic of his differences with
those who base their ideas about justice on the concept of utility. Imag-
ine that a person has been made the trustee of a large estate the owner of
which is deceased and the heirs to which are both ignorant of its exis-
tence and independently wealthy in their own right, while also being
immensely wasteful and uncharitable. Suppose the trustee and his family
of a wife and children are in dire financial straits and that the wealth
contained in the estate would be sufficient to relieve them of their
distress. Finally, assume that the trustee would be able, if he chose to do
so, to appropriate the estate for his family’s use without the possibility of
his appropriation ever being discovered by the heirs or anyone else. It is
clear in this scenario that the trustee would be able to increase the aggre-
gate happiness of the concerned parties, taking into account all the heirs
as well as all the members of his own family, by withholding the estate
from the heirs and appropriating it for the relief of his family. He would
be able to enhance the happiness of his family’s members greatly without
diminishing that of the heirs by even the slightest measure. Yet Kant
suggests that this act of appropriation would be wrong.The trustee has a
duty to distribute the estate in accordance with the will of its deceased
owner and would violate that duty by directing the estate to anyone
other than the intended heirs. (Notice that Kant’s reasoning would lead
to the same conclusion if the impoverished persons whose misery might
be relieved by receiving some share of the estate were strangers to the
trustee.) Despite the tug some might feel to divert the resources in ques-
tion from their intended beneficiaries in order to relieve human misery,
Kant argues that the trustee’s duty to distribute those resources in the
manner their owner intended should trump the temptation to divert the
resources for the promotion of happiness.This view has been summa-
rized pithily in the observation that for Kant, the right is (ethically or
morally) prior to the good.
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On these points, Rawls adopted views that were virtually identical to
Kant’s views. For Rawls, as for Kant, the attribute of human beings that
is important for the purposes of a theory of justice is their freedom, not
their happiness. Like Kant, Rawls had no objection to the pursuit of
happiness. In fact both thinkers assumed that a substantial portion of
people’s energies in life would be devoted to the pursuit of happiness.
Unlike the utilitarians, however, neither of these thinkers believed that it
is the task of a theory of justice to show how to maximize, or equalize,
or in any other way increase or distribute human happiness.
Following Kant’s lead, Rawls distinguishes between something he
calls “the right” and something else he calls “the good.” For Rawls, the
good can be defined in many different ways, but the conception of the
good in which he is most interested is the classical utilitarian conception,
which identifies the good with happiness.Whereas Rawls associates the
idea of the good first of all with the pursuit of happiness, he regards the
idea of the right as the basis of justice, and like Kant, Rawls considers the
right to be prior to the good. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls says that “in
justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good”
(RAWLS, 1971, 31) and that “This priority of the right over the good in
justice as fairness turns out to be a central feature of the conception”
(RAWLS, 1971, 32).
Rawls’s idea of the priority of the right has a major impact on the
principles of justice to which his theory leads. Recall Rawls’s two prin-
ciples of justice as fairness:
1. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of
liberties for all.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First,
they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.
(RAWLS, 1993, p. 291)
One of the crucial features of these two principles is what Rawls calls
lexical priority.According to Rawls, the first of these principles has lexical
priority over the second, and the first part of the second principle has
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lexical priority over its second part. Further, when these principles are
deployed to evaluate alternative possible basic structures of a society (I
shall say more about this subject in a few minutes), the two principles
taken together have lexical priority over all other considerations we
might bring to bear on that evaluation.
Let me use the relationship between Rawls’s two principles to illus-
trate his idea of lexical priority. For Rawls, the first of these principles has
lexical priority over the second.What he means by this claim is that the
first principle must be satisfied fully before the second comes into play,
just as one must go through all the words that begin with the letter “a” is
a dictionary before going on to the next letter.The ways in which a soci-
ety’s social and economic inequalities are distributed are relevant for an
evaluation of the justice of that society only when all its members enjoy
a fully adequate scheme of liberties.
In sum, Rawls appears to borrow from Kant 1) the assumption that
the idea of freedom, rather than the notion of happiness, is the founda-
tion of all sound ideas about justice; 2) the distinction between the right
and the good; and 3) the claim that the right is prior to the good.
Rawls also borrows primarily from Kant his idea that the way to
discover principles of justice for a society is to imagine a social contract
among its potential members, although this idea has roots in the writings
of Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau as well. Kant asks us to think of
the civil condition or state as the product of an “original contract” agreed
to by those who become its members. For him this contract is an “idea
of reason” rather than an empirical or historical fact, but it is an idea of
reason that in his view is of great practical import (KANT, 1991, p. 79).
For Kant, the idea of the original contract is a means for determining
whether or not laws and policies are just. If a law is such that a whole
people could not have agreed to it in an original contract, then that law
is unjust (KANT, 1991, p. 79; 99n). If on the other hand a law is such that
it could have been the object of such an agreement - an agreement to
which an entire people might have given its assent - then it is (at least
arguably) just.
Kant limited his use of the idea of a hypothetical original contract to
the task of testing the justice or injustice of laws and policies. In contrast,
Rawls uses the idea of a hypothetical contract to identify a set of princi-
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ples of social justice. Rawls’s use of this device is more ambitious and
more elaborate than Kant’s.
Rawls asks his readers to imagine that each member of society is
represented by an agent in a condition he calls the “original position,” a
hypothetical state of affairs in which the agents come together to reach
an agreement that will shape the terms on which the society operates.
The object of the agents’ agreement will be a set of principles of social
justice focused on the distribution of advantages in the society. Because
he wants his readers to imagine a hypothetical contract that will be far
more ambitious (in the sense of doing more intellectual work) than
Kant’s idea of the original contract, Rawls provides a significantly more
detailed description of the original position than Kant does of the orig-
inal contract.Yet the central idea of Rawls’s argument from the original
position originates in Kant, more so than in Hobbes or Locke or any of
the other major figures in the social contract tradition.
I have described these central ideas of Rawls’s theory, all of which he
borrowed mainly or entirely from Kant, in part to bring to your minds
some of the main claims of Rawls’s theory, and in part for the purpose of
comparison. My claim in this paper, remember, is that Smith’s contribu-
tions to the set of ideas on which Rawls drew to formulate his theory of
justice are as important to that theory as Kant’s contributions. Let me
turn now to some of Smith’s key ideas.
II
Adam Smith’s most famous idea is that the principal source of produc-
tivity and wealth in modern commercial societies is a highly developed
division of labor in which producers acquire extremely specialized skills
and great efficiency. Like David Hume, Smith argued that “Commerce
and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not
enjoy a regular administration of justice” (SMITH, 1937, p. 862), which
he equated with enforcement of property rights and contracts. But while
Smith agreed with Hume that enforcement of property rights and prom-
ises is a necessary basis for any successful commercial society, he went
beyond Hume in suggesting the opulence that can flow from a well-
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developed division of labor. In the opening sentence of his magnum opus
Smith argues that
The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the
greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any
where directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the
division of labor. (SMITH, 1937, p. 3)
The improvement made possible in this way, which can be observed in
the developed countries of Europe, is so great, Smith avows, that 
The accommodation of an European prince does not always so much
exceed that of an industrious and frugal peasant, as the accommodation of
the latter exceeds that of many an African king… (SMITH, 1937, p. 12)
Smith’s idea specifically is that it is the division of labor itself, rather than
the efforts of individual workers taken singly, that accounts for the great
bulk of the wealth generated in complex economies. Of course, all the
goods that are products of labor are ultimately produced by the actions of
individual workers, even if those actions are parsed into undetectably
small slices. Smith’s argument, however, is that the skills and efficiencies
individuals contribute to a production process, whether within a single
enterprise or, more importantly, within a society’s division of labor as a
whole, are made possible only by the fact that innumerable other persons
possess and deploy their own specialized skills and achieve their own effi-
ciencies.The skills and productivity of individuals are essential building
blocks for a productive economy as a whole, of course.Yet in the absence
of a complex division of labor, relatively few of the talents individuals
possess would be developed into skills.The skills individuals would devel-
op would be underutilized, and the individuals who possess them would
be able to produce little more than is required for their own subsistence.
Smith’s conception of the role of the division of labor in generating
wealth is often cited as one of the great pillars of modern economic
science. But this idea is also of central importance to modern ideas about
social justice. For if the division of labor accounts for the great bulk of the
productive capacities of a diverse group of people – not only by enabling
them to make highly productive use of the skills they possess, but also by
supplying them with opportunities and reasons for developing those skills
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in the first place – then the goods all these people produce are largely
social products rather than merely the creations of individuals. More than
any other single idea in the history of thought, Smith’s discovery of the
role the division of labor plays in the creation of wealth gave rise to the
view that that wealth is overwhelmingly a social product, and not merely
the sum of the products of many individual producers.
Smith’s conception of the division of labor has importance beyond its
role in his account of the generation of wealth, however. For Smith, a
society’s division of labor determines the basic contours of its social
world. Those contours are constituted by a set of role definitions that
prescribe entitlements and obligations for each of a society’s major
groups and determine its division of status and economic advantages.A
sketch of these entitlements and obligations would constitute a map of
the society’s terrain, a guide to the locations of privilege and deprivation
that are scattered throughout its population and to the patterns through
which those differences are reproduced or reconstituted over time.
In the vast bulk of ancient writings that touch on questions of justice,
the idea that the primary contours – the terrain – of the social world
might be reshaped to conform to a human design never arises. It is true
that the sophists in Athens in the fifth century B.C.E. raised a host of
questions that posed a challenge to unquestioned acceptance of the exist-
ing contours of society and developed the view that political institutions
and social arrangements are products of human contrivance and conven-
tion rather than being rooted in and justified through nature. Their
school of thought made a radical re-imagining of the social world possi-
ble. This view retained some vitality for several centuries while it
competed with the older belief that the basic contours of the social
world are given by nature (a view that is dominant in the thinking of
Plato and Aristotle).With the collapse of the Roman Empire in the west,
however, the sense of confidence in human capabilities that was
expressed in the view of the sophists and their successors eroded rapidly.
Early medieval writings and practices reveal a sense of the impotence of
human beings individually and collectively in the face of a world whose
order and working appeared knowable only to God.
As early as the tenth century, however, we can detect signs of a grad-
ual recovery of confidence in the capacities of humans to understand and
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to bring order to their world, largely through a recovery of Greek and
Roman ideas. By the twelfth century, scholars and practitioners had
begun to develop a uniform system of canon law, for which they turned
repeatedly to Roman sources, and many of the texts of ancient Greek
philosophy had been rediscovered from copies in Arabic that had been
preserved throughout the European middle ages, texts that were translat-
ed in quantity from the thirteenth century onward. The combined
impacts of logic and law demonstrated that it is possible through human
devices to discern and to impose order on a world that otherwise
appeared chaotic to human eyes.
The idea that the basic contours of the social world are a product of
human actions and potentially an object of human design rather than
being prescribed by nature stood forth at the center of the stage of early
modern thought in Hobbes’s Leviathan.Taking aim at Aristotle, Hobbes
ridiculed the assumption that political associations are endowed by nature
with an end (or in Aristotelian parlance, a “final cause”). On the contrary,
Hobbes argues, a political association is a product of human artifice.That
product may be unintended or deliberate, and if deliberate, it may be ill-
designed or well-designed. Insofar as political associations can be perfect-
ed, that perfection will be achieved through human efforts, human
knowledge, and human contrivance, not by allowing the association to
grow into some imagined “natural” form.
In the second chapter of The Wealth of Nations, Smith famously
remarks that the
division of labor, from which so many advantages are derived, is not
originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends
that general opulence to which it gives occasion.
The division of labor for Smith is originally an unintended consequence
of the actions of innumerable human beings all of whom were motivat-
ed by their own narrowly-defined objectives and none of whom foresaw
the great mechanism to which their actions would ultimately lead.Yet
Smith did not revert to the ancient view held by Aristotle and others that
the basic contours of the social world are dictated by nature. In his view
those contours are a product of human efforts. In its original form, the
ultimate product is unintended by any of those who engage in these
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efforts. Once the division of labor has taken shape and once its shape and
consequences have been understood – as Smith believed he had done –
a society’s division of labor and the contours of the social world that
stems largely from that division of labor become susceptible to deliberate
reforms. In fact, The Wealth of Nations is an emphatic argument for a set
of systematic reforms Smith believed would improve both the produc-
tivity and the equity of the social world that prevailed in the Scottish and
British societies of his time.
In short, in The Wealth of Nations Smith developed two ideas that would
play a significant role in later thinking about social justice, especially
Rawls’s theory of justice.The first is the idea that the wealth of any socie-
ty that is based on a complex division of labor is overwhelmingly a social
product. The second is the idea that it is possible for human beings to
reshape the contours of their social world to accord with a human design.
Let us now turn to Rawls’s theory of justice.
III
Rawls begins to lay out the most basic ideas of his theory with the
following words:
Let us assume, to fix ideas, that a society is a more or less self-sufficient
association of persons who in their relations to one another recognize
certain rules of conduct as binding and who for the most part act in
accordance with them. Suppose further that these rules specify a
system of cooperation designed to advance the good of those taking
part in it.Then, although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual
advantage, it is typically marked by a conflict as well as by an identity
of interests.There is an identity of interests since social cooperation
makes possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to
live solely by his own efforts.There is a conflict of interests since
persons are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced by
their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends
they each prefer a larger to a lesser share.A set of principles is required
for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine
this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the
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proper distributive shares.These principles are the principles of social
justice. (RAWLS, 1971, 4)
With this passage as a touchstone, let’s now look briefly at the theory’s
central ideas.
The most rudimentary of all the ideas underlying Rawls’s theory is
the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation among free and
equal persons over time from one generation to the next (RAWLS, 1991,
4-8). He sometimes calls this the “most fundamental intuitive idea” of the
theory. Rawls offers no argument to defend this idea. Instead, he assumes
that his readers will accept the idea as a plausible and appealing point of
departure and concentrates his creative energies on the construction of
an argument on the basis of this idea rather than on its defense.
This idea, then, plays a role in his theory of justice as fairness that is
similar to the role played by the fundamental intuitive ideas of geometry
in geometric reasoning. Although he did not believe it possible to
construct a robust and persuasive theory of justice through pure deduc-
tion, Rawls aspired to make the argument of his theory as much like
moral geometry as possible (RAWLS, 1999, 403n). The fundamental
ideas on which theories of this kind are based are neither true nor false,
and it makes little sense to attempt to prove or disprove them. Ultimate-
ly, those ideas stand or fall because of their usefulness or lack thereof. If
the propositions and theories that are based on those ideas yield plausible
or compelling accounts of the subjects to which they are addressed, then
the usefulness of those ideas has been demonstrated. If not, then the ideas
in question may be discarded in favor of alternatives.
Rawls believed that the idea of society as a fair system of social coop-
eration would be appealing to his readers. For most of his career (into the
early 1980s) he appeared to believe that this appeal would be universal, at
least to readers who had grappled sufficiently with the arguments of his
theory to grasp its main points correctly. In his later years he seemed to
retreat from this assumption by suggesting that his theory is designed to
appeal distinctively to people who inhabit cultures that have been shaped
by democratic and liberal ideals.
It is worth noting in any case that there is nothing bland or anodyne
about the proposition that society should be conceived as a fair system of
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social cooperation among free and equal persons. Rawls’s theory is built
on a proposition that is in fact highly controversial both in an historical
and in a geographical sense.Aristotle, for one, would have been aghast at
this claim. Insofar as he conceived of persons as bearers of worth, he
believed that they are of radically unequal worth because they are cate-
gorically unequal in capabilities, so that the notion that we should think
of society as a system of cooperation among equal persons would have
made no sense to him. Nor would he have had much sympathy or appre-
ciation for the emphasis this proposition places on freedom. For him,
human beings are endowed with functions that are prescribed by nature.
Excellence is exhibited through outstanding performance of those
prescribed functions, much as excellence in acting is displayed through
outstanding performance in a scripted role. Many pre-modern thinkers
would have found the fundamental intuitive idea of society as a fair
system of social cooperation among free and equal persons incompre-
hensible, and some would have found it reprehensible.The same things
can be said of many people today who have escaped the influence of or
rejected modern European ideas (they can also be said of some people
who embrace modern anti-liberal European ideas). On an historical and
worldwide scale, the foundation on which Rawls constructed his theory
is by itself a radical proposition.
For Rawls, the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation is
a basis for reasoning about societies in what he, following David Hume,
calls the circumstances of justice (RAWLS, 1971, 126-130).The circum-
stances of justice are circumstances of moderate scarcity, in which the
hand of nature is neither so generous as to give human beings all they
want with no need for labor or social cooperation, nor so harsh as to
force people into a struggle for survival so elemental as to preclude social
cooperation.The circumstances of justice are those in which we neither
enjoy unlimited abundance nor suffer extreme deprivation.
If the fundamental idea of Rawls’s theory is the idea of society as a
fair system of social cooperation among free and equal persons, the key
question of that theory is: on what terms should this cooperation
proceed? For the purposes of his theory of social justice, Rawls thinks of
society as a collaborative enterprise of a sort that is akin to a business
partnership, a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage.” (He did not,
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however, think of society as a voluntary association, because for the most
part membership in societies is thrust upon individuals who have little
or no chance either to grant or to withhold their consent [RAWLS,
2001, 4]). This conception of society is rooted in Adam Smith’s
contention that a complex division of labor is the principal source of the
great wealth of modern societies. For Rawls, questions about social
justice arise as a result of the productivity, broadly construed, that is
made possible by the division of labor. As he says, “social cooperation
makes possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to
live solely by his own efforts.” Society is a sort of partnership that is
undertaken for the mutual benefit of those who enter into – or in this
case, typically find that they are already partners in – that partnership.
The key question of social justice is a question about the terms of this
partnership, and in particular about the way in which its benefits should
be distributed among the participants.
From this conception it follows that for Rawls the distributive ques-
tions to which the idea of social justice points focus distinctively on the
social product, that is, on the “goods” (in a broad sense) that are generat-
ed by the joint efforts of the partners.These goods may not all be “mate-
rial” or “economic” goods of the sort Smith had in mind. For example,
they may include enjoyments of a non-economic kind that can be
achieved only through collaboration with others, such as the enjoyments
we derive from participating in a game that requires a number of partic-
ipants, or from friendship. It is these goods – the diverse class of goods
that are generated by the joint efforts of the partners – and these goods
alone, however, for which we require a set of principles to determine the
proper distributive shares.
To discover an answer to his central question, Rawls adopts the
method of imagining that a society has been founded by an agreement or
contract among its members that determines the terms of their associa-
tion.As I mentioned a short time ago, he borrowed this method prima-
rily from Kant. However, Kant had limited his use of the idea of a hypo-
thetical original contract to the task of testing the justice or injustice of
discrete, particular laws and policies. Rawls uses the idea of a hypotheti-
cal contract for a dramatically different purpose. For Rawls, the idea of a
hypothetical contract is a device for ascertaining a set of principles of
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social justice to be applied to what he calls the “basic structure” of a just
society, and to be applied only to the basic structure of a just society.
A society’s basic structure as Rawls envisages it comprises its major
social institutions, including its political constitution, fundamental
economic structures, and principal social arrangements. For example, the
institutions of private property in the means of production and compet-
itive markets are central components in the economic structures of some
societies, whereas others have been based on collective ownership of the
means of production and command economies. Some countries’ politi-
cal constitutions provide strong legal protections for freedom of thought
and liberty of conscience; others do not.The monogamous family is a
bedrock social institution in many societies, while in others the polyga-
mous family in one form or another has stood for centuries as one of
society’s principal social arrangements.
What does the basic structure of a society not include? In various
passages Rawls takes special note of two categories of things that can be
said to be just or unjust, yet are not the subjects of his theory.One of these
consists of the kinds of rules that regulate interactions and transactions
among private persons, such as those which regulate contractual agree-
ments and those which apply to the practices of private associations
(RAWLS, 1971, 8).The other is individual actions and transactions.These
things can certainly be said to be just or unjust, but they are not the
subject of Rawls’s theory. His topic is social justice, and in his view the
appropriate subject of a theory of social justice is a society’s basic structure.
Why focus on the basic structure of society? Rawls’s main argument
is that the institutions and practices that comprise a society’s basic struc-
ture determine how well the members of a society are able to do in life,
both in absolute terms and in comparison with others. In fact, in the
most precise sense it is the division of advantages that results from a soci-
ety’s basic structure rather than the basic structure itself that is the real
subject of the theory (RAWLS, 1971, 7).
We can glean some additional features of Rawls’s argument for focus-
ing on the basic structure by looking at the following passage:
The basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects
are so profound and present from the start.The intuitive notion here is
that this structure contains various social positions and that men born
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into different positions have different expectations of life… In this way
the institutions of society favor certain starting places over others.
These are especially deep inequalities. Not only are they pervasive, but
they affect men’s initial chances in life; yet they cannot possibly be
justified by an appeal to the notions of merit or desert. (RAWLS, 1971, 7)
This passage reveals two significant points. First, in arguing for the basic
structure as the appropriate subject of a theory of social justice, it is evident
that Rawls’s concerns about inequalities were concentrated on inequalities
in people’s life chances – on the (differential) opportunities available to
people – and not on ultimate outcomes. He writes here of the different
positions men are “born into,” of their “starting places” and “initial
chances.” Second, the passage hints at the fact (made clearer in later discus-
sions) that Rawls was concerned about the ways in which major social
institutions shape individuals’ aspirations and expectations as well as about
the ways in which those institutions determine the division of advantages.
Even if they have similar objective opportunities, some people do less well
than others in life because they have lower aspirations or expectations.
These aspirations and expectations themselves are shaped by the basic
structure of society, and these subjective disparities among people were as
worrisome to Rawls as objective differences in opportunities.
Nowhere in Kant’s theory of justice, nor in his philosophy as a whole,
do we find anything resembling Rawls’s idea of the basic structure of
society. Although Rawls borrowed from Kant the idea of the original
contract, Rawls applied that idea to a completely different subject.Where
Kant evoked the idea of the original contract as a test of whether partic-
ular laws and policies are just, Rawls uses the idea of a social contract to
discover a set of principles of justice to be applied to the basic structure
of society, and only to that basic structure.
Rawls’s idea of the basic structure of society – the subject to which
his theory of justice applies – is a version of Smith’s idea of a division of
labor that shapes the basic contours of the social world, thereby deter-
mining the distribution of entitlements and obligations in a society.
Whether or not Rawls borrowed the idea of the basic structure of soci-
ety directly from Smith, that idea is a lineal descendant of the central idea
of Smith’s Wealth of Nations.
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For Rawls, the basic structure is not merely one among several
possible subjects of a theory of justice and social justice is not merely
one among several possible types of justice. Social justice is instead
justice in the most comprehensive and fundamental sense. Rawls
envisages a division of labor between the principles of justice that
apply to the basic structure and the rules or criteria of justice that
apply to all other subjects.The principles of social justice are distinct
from the rules and criteria that apply to other subjects.That is why he
says that the “way in which we think about fairness in everyday life ill
prepares us for the great shift in perspective required for considering
the justice of the basic structure itself.” (RAWLS, 1999b, 337) At the
same time, those principles are also intellectually prior to these other
rules and criteria and serve as a foundation for defensible ideas about
justice with regard to other subjects. As he observes in A Theory of
Justice, once we have a sound theory of social justice, “the remaining
problems of justice [including those which have to do with transac-
tions, with criminal actions and punishments, and with compensatory
justice, among other subjects] will prove more tractable in the light of
it” (RAWLS, 1971, 8).
The distinction Rawls draws between the principles of justice that
apply to the basic structure and the rules and criteria of justice that apply
to other subjects serves an important substantive purpose for his theory
of justice as a whole. One of Rawls’s principal objections to utilitarian-
ism is that it is based on a monistic conception of the good – in other
words, that it fails to accord due recognition to the fact that human
beings legitimately hold a plurality of conceptions of the good. In his
view, classical utilitarianism is a “comprehensive” theory, that is, a moral
theory that offers prescriptions for the design of human institutions as
well as for the decisions individuals should make, and indeed for all
subjects to which any moral theory can be applied. Kant’s theory, too, is
based on a set of moral ideas that Kant applies both to the actions of
individuals and to rules and policies.The strong distinction Rawls draws
between principles of justice that apply to the basic structure and crite-
ria of justice for other subjects enables him to leave room for the plural-
ity of moral views about those other subjects he believes should be
accommodated by a theory of social justice, a plurality that he believes is
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not accommodated by utilitarian theories and not adequately accommo-
dated by Kant’s ideas about morality and justice.
Hence both the question Rawls attempts to answer in his theory of
justice and the answer to that question are shaped profoundly by ideas
that either originate in or were developed by Adam Smith in The Wealth
of Nations. Rawls could not have asked the question he poses in A Theo-
ry of Justice in the absence of Smith’s claim that the overwhelming bulk of
the wealth that is generated in relatively developed societies is a social
product, and not merely the sum of the products of individual producers
taken separately. Rawls’s question is a question about the way in which
that product should be distributed in a just society. Moreover, Rawls
could not have answered that question in the way he does in the absence
of something like Smith’s conception of the division of labor and its
effects on society. For Smith’s conception is the direct ancestor of and the
basis for Rawls’s idea of the basic structure of society, which he took to
be the appropriate subject of a theory of social justice.
IV
To conclude this paper, I should like to offer some brief observations that
I hope will convey some sense of the important and problematic role
Rawls’s appropriation of Adam Smith’s ideas plays in Rawls’s theory.
Rawls’s assertion that the basic structure of society is the appropriate
subject of a theory of social justice is widely understood to be one of the
most distinctive claims of his theory. As we have seen, the claim is not
merely that the basic structure happens to be the appropriate subject of a
theory of social justice in the same way as (say) law violations are the
appropriate subject of a theory of penal justice. It is rather that the basic
structure has a kind of priority over all other kinds of subjects pertaining
to justice, so that social justice is justice in the most comprehensive and
fundamental sense. For Rawls, a sound theory of social justice provides
the necessary foundation on which we can construct solutions to other,
less comprehensive problems of justice.
If we examine Rawls’s arguments closely, we can see that his claim
consists of three distinct parts.The first is a causal claim that the institu-
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tions and practices that comprise a society’s basic structure determine
how well the members of a society are able to do in life.The second is
the conceptual claim that the principles of justice that apply to the basic
structure may be quite different in character from the rules and criteria
that apply to other problems of justice.The third is a claim of intellectu-
al priority.The claim is that we can best address the wide range of ques-
tions that arise about justice by first developing a sound theory of social
justice. This theory can then constitute the foundation for defensible
ideas about justice with regard to other subjects.
The first of these claims in a general form is incontrovertible. How
completely a society’s basic structure determines how well its members
are able to do may be controversial, but there can be little doubt that a
society’s major institutions have profound effects on its members and on
the division of advantages among them.
It is not difficult to see the force of Rawls’s second claim as well.
Consider the example of labor contracts. In a society made up of
employers who are small business owners with limited resources and
employees who are independent proprietors with a significant range of
employment opportunities from which to choose, we can expect that
justice will be served if all parties are free to enter into labor contracts on
whatever terms are mutually agreeable. Since all parties possess roughly
equal bargaining power, the bargains they reach can be expected typical-
ly to be fair. Matters will be different in a society dominated by giant
corporate employers with vast resources at their command and by
employees who have few alternatives (or in the limiting case of some
company towns, only one serious employment opportunity). Because of
the great disparities in bargaining power in the latter scenario, freedom of
contract is likely to lead to labor agreements that are unfair to employ-
ees. In that case collective bargaining arrangements, which reduce dispar-
ities in bargaining power between employees and employers, may restore
some balance and justice to the labor contracts to which the parties
agree. (In some cases, of course, collective bargaining arrangements may
confer excessive power on those who bargain on behalf of employees.) A
significant shift in perspective is required to grasp the fact that fairness is
best secured in situations of great disparity in bargaining power by
arrangements that differ sharply from those which typically lead to fair
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bargains in situations of relatively equal bargaining power. It is not
surprising that a similar or greater shift in perspective may be required to
grasp the fact that fair principles of justice for the basic structure of a
society may differ markedly from the rules or criteria of justice that apply
to ordinary interactions among individuals.
The third claim that is embedded in Rawls’s assertion that the basic
structure of society is the appropriate subject of a theory of social justice
is more problematical.This is the claim that the principles of social justice
are intellectually prior to and serve as a foundation for defensible ideas
about justice with regard to other subjects. Consider for another brief
moment the example of labor contracts. If agreements reached by
employers and employees who possess roughly equal bargaining power
under conditions of freedom of contract are likely to be fair, the reason
for this fact is that those agreements typically will embody the norm of
balanced reciprocity, according to which relations among relative equals
are just when those equal persons exchange things that are of equal value,
whether these things are benefits or harms. If collective bargaining
arrangements help to restore fairness under conditions of highly unequal
bargaining power, the reason is that those arrangements bring labor
agreements more nearly into line with the norm of balanced reciprocity.
Nothing is more central to the way in which human beings think
about fairness among relative equals than the norm of balanced reciproc-
ity. In a chapter in A Theory of Justice on “The Sense of Justice,” Rawls
observes that “reciprocity, a tendency to answer in kind… is a deep
psychological fact… A capacity for a sense of justice built up by respons-
es in kind would appear to be a condition of human sociability”
(RAWLS, 1971, 494-95).
The kind of reciprocity Rawls has in mind here is balanced reciproc-
ity, “a tendency to answer in kind.” Although the justice of collective
bargaining arrangements is not intuitively obvious to most people, the
argument for the justice of those arrangements rests on intuitions that are
highly accessible as well as widely, perhaps even universally, shared.The
same thing can be said of the principles of social justice, as Rawls seems
to acknowledge when he observes that the “most stable conceptions of
justice are presumably those for which the corresponding sense of justice
is most firmly based on these tendencies” (RAWLS, 1971, 495).
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In short, while it seems sensible to claim both that a society’s basic
structure plays a large causal role in determining how well its members
are able to do and that the principles of social justice may be distinct
from those which apply to other subjects, it is misleading to suppose
that the principles of social justice are intellectually prior to and consti-
tute the foundation for ideas about justice in relation to all other
subjects. The kind of justice that applies directly to relations among
persons is not trumped by the principles of social justice. Instead, the
principles of social justice are rooted in the idea of justice in direct rela-
tions among persons.This idea – that justice among relative equals is
based on the norm of balanced reciprocity – possesses an integrity that
is not overshadowed by, and in fact provides the intellectual foundation
for, sound ideas about social justice. Principles of social justice are
distinct from the principles that apply to direct relations among relative
equals because the complexity of social institutions and practices
requires adjustments to those principles. Ultimately, however, sound
principles of social justice will be based on the norm of balanced reci-
procity among relative equals.
If sound ideas about social justice are rooted in the norm of balanced
reciprocity, then the concept of desert, which Rawls dismisses perfuncto-
rily, may have a role to play in the way we think about justice, including
social justice, after all. If two persons,A and B, are relative equals, and A
confers a benefit on B, then there is a sense in which A deserves to be
requited with a benefit similar in value to the benefit she has conferred
and B has an obligation of justice to bestow a benefit on A in return for
the benefit he has received. Similarly, if Q inflicts a harm on R, then
there is a sense, independent of any particular conception of social justice,
in which Q deserves to suffer some harm in return.
Of course, the norm of balanced reciprocity in its simplest form – the
form that applies to bilateral relations between relative equals – is not
adequate as a guide to justice in relations among persons in circumstances
that are complex. In situations that are multilateral or in which people are
unequally placed, the social arrangements that would lead to justice in
relations among persons may be dramatically different from those which
apply to simple bilateral relations between equals.To accommodate these
situations, major adjustments are needed in much the same way as adjust-
84
doispontos, Curitiba, São Carlos, vol. 7, n. 4, p.65-86, setembro, 2010
ments are required in bargaining between employees and employers
when the disparities in bargaining power between them are large.
We can therefore see how the concept of desert might play a signifi-
cant role in the way we think about justice without leading us to endorse
either the principle of desert or retributivist reasoning in its classic form.
Rawls was right to see that the principles of justice that apply to the basic
structure of a society are conceptually distinct from the rules of justice
that apply to simple bilateral relations between persons. In fact his insight
is generalizable to many subjects in addition to the basic structure of
society. Yet regardless of the particular subject for which they are
designed, if principles of justice are to be recognizable and acceptable to
human beings, they must be rooted in the sense of justice, a sense that is
best expressed through the concepts of reciprocity and desert.
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